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I. MEASURING AND SATISFYING THE PAYMENTS INTERESTS OF
FINANCIAL MARKET PLAYERS

This is an article about whether the new and complex law governing
the movement of big money satisfies the interests of the money
movers. 1 The purpose of wire transfer law should be to satisfy the
interests of three groups that regularly participate in financial market
transactions:
traders, settlements departments and funds transfer
systems. 2 Is this purpose met, and how can we gauge whether it is?
The crux of the analysis is contained in two conceptual steps. First,
do the "rules of the wire" produce one or more of the following
microeconomic benefits for one or more ofthe financial market players:
reduce uncertainty and transactions costs, efficiently allocate risks and
losses, avoid moral hazard and free rider problems or generate
economies of scale? Second, do the rules lower credit, market,
settlement and systemic risks associated with transactions in securities,
money-market instruments and foreign exchange? If funds transfer law

I. The two statutes discussed herein are Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C. or Article 4A) and the United Nations Model Law on International Credit Transfers (U.N.
Model Law). The version of U.C.C. Article 4A cited to herein is the 1989 Official Text with
Comments approved by the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. U.C.C. art. 4A, 28 U.L.A. 455-549 (1989). The U.N. Model Law is
published in U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992)
[hereinafter U.N. MODEL LAW]. U.C.C. Article 4A governs the electronic transfer of roughly two
trillion dollars of bank credit every day. See ERNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER & RAJ
BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 3, 5-6 (1993). Because Article 4A has been adopted by nearly every
state, it is unlikely that the U.N. Model Law will be enacted in the United States. Foreign
countries, however, may well enact all or part of the U.N. Model Law, in which case it would
govern the transfer of vast sums of funds denominated in foreign currencies.
2. Of course, these interests should be satisfied without contravening appropriate public
policy. Indeed, one purpose for Federal Reserve participation in the drafting of the U.C.C. and
the U.N. Model Law was to ensure that appropriate public policy concerns were considered.
This is a companion article to Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY.
L.J. 347 (1993-1994). In that article, I lay the theoretical foundation for the current work. The
Inverted Pyramid addresses the issues of why and to whom wire transfer law is important and
argues that the answers are found in the interests of financial market players and, ultimately, the
growth and development of financial markets. This Article takes up where The Inverted Pyramid
left off by critically analyzing specific provisions in wire transfer law in relation to the interests
of the players.
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provides an affirmative answer to both questions, then players in the
financial markets are more likely to use funds transfers to settle
payment obligations arising from their deals. In tum, courts will uphold
their arrangements as consistent with public policy which will alleviate
uncertainty and transaction enforcement costs. The rules of U.C.C.
Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law generally, but not always, yield
these answers; where they do not, statutory reforms are needed.
The thesis advanced is two-fold. First, microeconomic and banking

concepts should be the critical analytical tools for measuring how well
specific provisions of funds transfer law advance the interests of
financial market players. Most of the insights are derived through a
small number of straightforward concepts. With respect to microeconomics,3 there are five key tools: (1) transactions costs, 4 (2)
uncertainty, 5 (3) efficient loss allocation, 6 (4) moral hazard' and (5)

3. This Article is not intended to be a full-scale technical exposition of the microeconomics
of funds transfer law. Professors Cooter and Rubin justify their use of microeconomic analysis
on the grounds that their topic (loss allocation in consumer payments) "is a technical and largely
monetary subject ...." Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for
Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 66 (1987). These are also features of wholesale funds
transfers and accordingly make microeconomic analysis "an appropriate and promising place to
start." /d. But, the essence of the argument here is to place funds transfers in the broader context
of the financial markets. To make the link between financial market activity and the attractiveness
of funds transfers as a means of payment to financial market players, the application of
microeconomic tools in an informal, non-mathematical manner suffices.
4. This is a generic term designed to capture a number of specific costs that arise in
particular situations, including the costs of negotiating and monitoring a cooperative solution, the
costs of communication, strategic costs, and the costs of enforcement (which arise because
ambiguous or inappropriate rules prompt litigation). See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 100-02 (1988). The specific cost envisioned in settling payments obligations
arising from financial market transactions is the cost of the funds transfer.
5. The meaning of"uncertainty" intended here is "primary" or "event" uncertainty, which
"exists because certain future events that are crucial to economic decisions taken today are
unknown or unknowable." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 55. In contrast, "secondary" or
"market" uncertainty exists where "information about certain future or present events is known to
some but not to all economic actors." /d. The latter involves informational asymmetry. If the.
application of the laws governing funds transfers leads to unpredictable results, or if there is a legal
void in that no funds transfer laws exist, then all parties are likely to share the same informational
disadvantage (although in some instances one party may have less of a disadvantage and act
accordingly). Future events, such as the outcome of an interloper fraud case, are unknown; hence
there is primary uncertainty.
6. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70-86, which discusses the loss spreading, loss
reduction, and loss imposition principles and the consistency of legal policy· recommendations
suggested by these principles. For a more theoretical treatment of efficiency, see John L. Hanks,
On a Just Measure of the Efficiency of Law and Governmental Policies, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. I
(1986) and David G. Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments on Some Recent
Suggestions, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 39 (1986).
7. This is "the problem that arises when the behavior of the insuree changes after the
purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or the size of the loss increases." COOTER &
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economies of scale. 8 The four key banking concepts are different types
of risk analysis: (I) credit risk, 9 (2) market risk, 10 (3) settlement
risk 11 and (4) systemic risk. 12 The extent of the intersection between
the law and the interests of the players should be gauged using
fundamental analytical concepts drawn from these two disciplines.
Second, U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law adequately

address many, but not all, of these interests. Where a gap exists
between the law and its purpose, statutory reform is required.
Technical rules regarding: (I) same-day execution, 13 (2) consequential
damage liability, 14 (3) receiver finality, 15 (4) discharge, 16 (5) payment order processing, 17 (6) money-back guarantees, 18 (7) interloper
fraud 19 and (8) variation by agreement2° should be assessed using
these microeconomic and banking concepts in order to appraise the link
between funds transfer law and the growth and development of the
financial market. Where the technical rules fail to serve the broader
policy goal of aiding the growth and development of domestic and
international financial markets, changes to the rules are in order. 21

ULEN, supra note 4, at 65-66.
8. These occur "when the cost per unit (or average cost) of production declines as the total
amount of output increases." /d. at 97 n.S.
9. "Credit risk" is "the risk that a counterparty to a transaction will fail to perform according
to the terms and conditions of the contract, thus causing the holder of the claim to suffer a loss."
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, AND OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DERIVATIVE PRODUCT
ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS: JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN REsPONSE TO QUESTIONS
POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE ON DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS app. Ill at 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter, JOINT
DERIVATIVES STUDY].
I 0. This is "the risk of a change in the price of an asset." /d. app. III at 7.
II. As "between two counterparties, [this is] the risk that a counterparty to whom a firm has
made a delivery of assets or money defaults before the amounts due or assets have been received;
or the risk that technical difficulties interrupt delivery or settlement even if the counterparties are
able to perform." /d. app. Ill at 9.
· 12. Systemic risk pertains to the contagion effect and is the financial market analog to the
domino theory of international politics. It is "the risk that a disruption (at a firm, in a market
segment, to a settlement system etc.) causes widespread difficulties at other firms, in other market
segments or in the financial system as a whole." /d. app. III at 10.
13. See infra part IIJ.A.
14. See infra part Ill.B.
15. See infra part IV .A.
16. See infra part IV.A.
17. See infra part IV .B.
18. See infra part JV.B.
19. See infra part IV.C.
20. See infra part V.A.
21. It is generally accepted that many of these technical rules arose as a result of negotiations
among the drafters. The analysis offered herein does not suggest that political deal-making in the
drafting process is unimportant or that an economic construct is a complete explanation of the
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Whether funds transfer law 22 adequately addresses the interests of
those involved in settling these payment obligations is an unexplored
topic. This lack of exploration is ironic because every day we hear or
read about trillions of dollars worth of transactions in the markets for
foreign exchange, 23 short-term instruments, 24 corporate securities, 25
derivative products26 and interbank lending. 27 What we do not focus
on is how the payment obligations generated by these transactions are
settled. We implicitly, but wrongly, assume that the trade of U.S.
dollars for Japanese yen, the purchase of British Telecom shares by
Credit Suisse on behalf of a private client on the London Stock
Exchange and the overnight loan of ten million French francs by
Banque Nationale de Paris to Citibank is done when the traders at the
financial institutions agree over the telephone to the terms and
conditions. There are, in truth, many more activities involved; one of

process.
22. The term "funds transfers" is technically more accurate than the term "wire transfers"
because payment orders may be transmitted not only by wire (electronically), but also orally (by
·telephone) or in writing (by letter). See U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6 (1989). It is legally incorrect to
think of a funds transfer as money moving through a pipeline. A funds transfer is a transfer of
bank credit from one account to another. /d. § 4A-l 04 cmt. 4. l11e account holder has a nonpossessory personal property interest, or chose in action, in the bank account. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990).
23. This is a global, twenty-four hour market for trading national currencies. See generally
RUDI WEISWEILLER, HOW THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET WORKS (original English language
ed. 1990).
24. This is a generic term for the interbank market in several distinct, short-term money
market instruments such as U.S. Treasury bills (short-term debt issued at a discount and redeemed
at face value), short-term government agency securities (e.g., discount notes issued by the Federal
National Mortgage Association), commercial paper (promissory notes issued at a discount and
redeemed at par value, or paying a fixed interest rate) and repurchase agreements or "repos" (the
temporary sale of securities subject to an agreement of repurchase where the difference between
the sale and repurchase prices yields a set interest rate). See FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK, A POCKET GUIDE TO SELECTED SHORT-TERM INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET
( 1987).
25. This refers to the equity and debt securities issued by corporations.
26. "[A] derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one or more
underlying assets or indexes of asset values." JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 2.
Derivative instruments include futures contracts, options and swaps. See id. app. III at 5, 8, I 0.
27. A principal form of interbank lending is the purchase and sale of Federal funds (Fed
funds) and repurchase agreements (repos). The Fed funds "market is described as one in which
commercial banks borrow and lend excess reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve." Charles
M. Lucas et at., Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements, FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q.
REV., Summer 1977, at 33, reprinted in part in FINANCIAL MARKETS: INSTRUMENTS AND
CONCEPTS 9, 9-10 (John R. Brick et at. eds., 2d ed. 1986). Accordingly, there is an overlap
between the terms "short-term money market instruments" and "interbank borrowing and lending"
in that Fed funds and repos are short-term instruments and the subject of interbank lending. Note
also that borrowing Fed funds is referred to as a "purchase" of Fed funds while lending is referred
to as a "sale."
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these is the settlement of the payment obligations. How are the U.S.
dollars sent to their purchaser? How does Credit Suisse pay for the
stock? How does Banque Nationale de Paris get the francs to Citibank?
The answer to each of these questions is very likely the same: wire
transfer. The hidden fact is that many, if not most, payment obligations
are settled by wire transfer.
The remainder of this Article is organized into five parts. Part II
establishes a hypothetical international financial transaction and
identifies the key players and their interests. This hypothetical is
referred to in the subsequent parts. Part III focuses on the interests that
traders in financial markets have with respect to a funds transfer statute.
Similarly, Part IV studies the interests of settlements departments of
financial institutions and Part V examines the interests of funds transfer
systems in which the financial institutions participate. The emphasis in
Parts III-V is on the critique of U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model
Law in light of these interests, using analytical tools drawn from
microeconomics and banking. Conclusions are set forth in Part VI.
II. FINANCIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS

A. The Interest Groups
Who are the movers of big money? Financial institutions, namely
commercial banks like Citibank and securities firms such as Merrill
Lynch, are the most prominent participants in domestic and international
financial markets. 28 The conventional approach to analyzing the
markets is to view these institutions as a whole and consider them as
monoliths. Unfortunately, this approach obscures the rich diversity of
groups within each institution, as well as the diversity of their interests.
The approach also fails to account for private groups and networks

28. See generally A Survey of the International Capital Markets, ECONOMIST, July 21-27,
1990, at I. Large corporations such as IBM also participate in the markets, typically to hedge
against currency or interest rate risk exposures on their balance sheets. See, e.g., Eugene E.
Comiskey and Charles W. Mulford, Risks of Foreign Currency Transactions: A Guide for Loan
Officers, S COM. LENDING REV. 44, 44-45 (1990). Wealthy, sophisticated individual investors are
also participants. See, e.g., Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993) (involving
a doctor trading over-the-counter foreign exchange option contracts). Central banks such as the
Federal Reserve participate intermittently in some markets to implement domestic monetary or
international exchange rate policies. See, e.g., Review of Treasury Department's Conduct of
International Financial Policy: Hearing Before the House Commillee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 4-22, 60-74 (Aug. 14, 1990) (statement of David C. Mulford,
Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs); FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK, FEDPOINTS 44: FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION (1988). The most prominent
participants are, however, commercial banks and securities firms.
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formed by several institutions acting collectively. It is not enough to
ask about Citibank's or Merrill Lynch's interests with respect to a funds
transfer statute.
Rather, these institutions must be intellectually
dissected and specific groups must be isolated.
1. Traders
This close inspection of financial institutions results in the identification of two distinct interest groups: traders and settlements departments. Financial institutions employ large numbers of traders to buy
and sell foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments,
corporate securities and derivative products. 29 The world of the trader
is one of advanced information technology in which she electronically
communicates instantaneously with her trading counterparties around
the world by electronic devices. In seconds the trader buys and sells
millions of dollars worth of Thai baht, General Motors commercial
paper, Singapore Airlines stock or put options on British pounds. 30
This is a world in which geographical borders mean nothing; information technology and financial market deregulation allow a trader to
make transactions anytime, anyplace. 31
The trader wants to be able to move rapidly to take advantage of
profitable trading opportunities, and to do so cheaply so that the very
costs of transacting do not devour a sizeable chunk of her profits.
Paying or receiving payment for foreign exchange or financial instruments bought or sold by means of paper-based instruments like checks
is slow and cumbersome.
Moreover, a paper-based system has
opportunity costs: Expected payments that are held up in the check
collection process would be unavailable for use in new financial deals.
It is not surprising, then, that the trader prefers to settle payments
obligations arising from her transactions in the markets mentioned
above by means of a funds transfer. A funds transfer system has the
benefits of low cost and high speed. The trader's preference for funds
transfer settlement is apparent in that foreign exchange obligations are
settled by funds transfer. 32 A less well known example of the trader's

29. Interbank lending operations, which involve settlement by funds transfer (see supra note
27), may be conducted out of the institution's treasury function. For present purposes, the
distinction between the trading and treasury departments is immaterial.
30. In practice, there is a division of labor on the trading floor of financial institutions.
Traders tend to specialize in one market, such as Far East equities, rather than several distinct
markets.
31. See generally RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF
GEOGRAPHY 1-6 (1992) (discussing the end of geography as a relevant factor in financial
transactions).
32. See J. 0RLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 75 (2d ed. 1991); see also
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preference is that payments associated with derivative products,
specifically options and futures, are made by funds transfers. 33
Payments obligations arising from purchases of some stocks, bonds and
government agency issues are settled by funds transfers. 34 In fact,
funds transfers are an increasingly common method for settling
corporate stock and bond transactions. 35 In the short-term money
markets, funds transfers also are used to settle payments obligations
arising from purchases and sales of Fed funds and repos. 36 Payments
obligations associated with commercial paper also are settled by
Fedwire funds transfers. 37 The trader's preference for funds transfer
as a means of payment is based on the inherent celerity and cost of this
device. Consequently, the trader wants a funds transfer law that
promotes both high speed and low cost funds transfers to settle
payments obligations arising from her purchases and sales in these
important financial markets.

ROGER M. KUBARYCH, FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS
IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (rev. ed. 1983).
33. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. GAO/GGD-90-33, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT
REFORM: THE STOCK, OPTIONS, AND FUTURES MARKETS ARE STILL AT RISK 40 (1990)
(hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].
34. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL REsERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 109 (7th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS].
35. See the discussion of the same-day funds settlement proposal of the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Depository Trust Company (DTC) contained in
MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY AND NATIONAL SECURITIES CLEARING
CORPORATION TO USERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES RE: A SAME-DAY FUNDS SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
PROPOSAL FOR INDUSTRY EVALUATION S (June I, 1992) (hereinafter SDFS PROPOSAL].
Essentially, the current DTC-NSCC system for settling transactions in common stocks, preferred
stocks, corporate and municipal bonds, unit investment trusts and warrants is a next-day funds
settlement system. An NSCC member or DTC participant that owes money to NSCC or DTC as
a result of a securities transaction pays by certified check. If NSCC or DTC owes money,
payment is made by draft. The certified checks and drafts clear in one day. /d. at S-6. However,
NSCC and DTC propose to switch to a same-day funds settlement system whereby all payments
to or from members and participants arising from securities transactions would be made by
Fedwire funds transfers. /d. at I, S-6. This would be a "same-day funds settlement system,"
which currently is offered by NSCC and DTC only for commercial paper trades. /d. at 5.
36. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 34, at 109. Indeed, it has been suggested that the
Fed funds and repo markets should be called "the markets for short-term immediately available
funds" because both markets are settled in "immediately available funds" (a term referring to funds
transfers through Fedwire). Lucas, supra note 27, at 10.
37. DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
. 214, 386-87 ( 1986). See also supra note 35 for the discussion of the same-day funds settlement
proposal of the National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository Trust Company.
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2. Settlements Departments
When the trader has agreed with her counterparty to buy or sell
foreign currency or a financial instrument-such agreement typically is
made over the telephone--she will issue payment instructions (orally or
in writing) to her colleagues in the settlements department. The
settlements clerks, employed by the same financial institution as the
trader, are charged with the responsibility of processing large volumes
of payment orders in a short period of time. The orders reflect
completed transactions entered into by all of the institution's traders.
Accordingly, certainty in the sense of routine algorithms for handling
the orders is critical. If the settlements department had to examine each
order by hand for potential inconsistencies or fraud, then payments
could not be made quickly. Similarly, knowing when final payment is
made, (that is, when a credit received is irrevocable) and when
discharge occurs (that is, when an underlying contractual obligation
arising from a trade is discharged) adds certainty to the movement of
money. There is, then, a synergistic relationship between the trader and
the institution's settlements department with respect to moving big
money: The trader wants to make or receive payments rapidly, which
is made possible in part by standardized methods for processing
payment orders.
The settlements department is commonly referred to as the back
office. 38 This is a misleading label, however, because it conjures up
notions of mounds of paper piled up on desks of bureaucraticallyminded employees. In fact, the back office is a critical link in a funds
transfer chain because of the systemic importance of its operations. The
October 1987 stock market crash demonstrates the systemic risk
problem associated with the failure of one or a few trading institutions
and the relevance of funds transfers. 39 When the crash occurred, many

38. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 35-36 (discussing mechanics of foreign exchange
settlement).
39. Since the October 19, 1987 stock market crash, these systems have been the subject of
increasing attention from financial market regulators. As the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) stated:
Properly operating clearance and settlement systems are important to the efficiency and
integrity of financial markets. Their failure to continue to operate in volatile markets
can further exacerbate market instability. The inability of a major clearing member to
meet major obligations could jeopardize the financial health of all the clearing organizations to which it belongs, because the trade guarantee makes the clearing organization
responsible for fulfilling the financial obligations of its failed clearing members.
1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 15. See also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990) [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT, after the Chairman of the

676

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

commercial and investment banks that were obligated to pay for
securities were unable to fulfill this obligation, or were late in doing so.
Among the reasons for the delayed payments was that "[t]he federal
wire transfer system essential for fund transfers did not work on several
occasions."40 In other words, problems in making funds transfers
caused delays in discharging payments obligations. Creditors were,
therefore, at risk during the period of delay. To the extent that they
relied on timely payment from their debtors to fund their own payments
obligations, creditors risked defaulting on these obligations. From the
back office's perspective, to avoid such systemic risk, funds transfer law
should promote standardized, automated means for processing payment
orders and resolving problems. It should satisfy the concerns regarding
the authentication of payment instructions and allocation of the risk of
interloper fraud. Rules on receiver finality and discharge are necessary.
These interests are particularly acute during periods of stress caused by
turmoil in financial markets. 41
3. Funds Transfer Systems
A third important interest group in the financial markets is evident
not from dissecting a particular financial institution, but from observing
the private arrangements that several such institutions make in connection with funds transfers. The two most prominent U.S. systems, the
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Federal
Reserve's wire transfer network (Fedwire), are used by financial
institutions around the world to make funds transfers denominated in
U.S. dollars. 42 A "funds transfer system" is "a wire transfer network
. . . or other communication system of a clearing house or other
association of banks through which a payment order by a bank may be
transmitted to the bank to which the order is addressed." 43

Committee, M.A. Lamfalussy ].
40. 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 42.
41. To be sure, these considerations are relevant to back offices utilizing other modes of
payment such as checks and credit cards. However, those modes are inherently more cumbersome
than funds transfers and, therefore, less able to meet the needs of financial market players.
42. See generally PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at xxvi, 10-11, 17-19, 140,
192-93. Fedwire is owned and operated by the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. /d. at xxvi. Any
"depository institution," as defined in the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)), is entitled to use Fedwire. /d. at
II; see 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1988). One hundred and twenty-two financial institutions are
participants in the privately organized and operated CHIPS. PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra
note I, at 194.
43. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5). The U.N. Model Law does not define this term and, in fact, uses
it only once. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 6(b)(iv).
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Reducing systemic risk during periods of market stress such as the
October 1987 crash is important to such systems. The failure of one
system participant to settle its debts with other participants can cause
liquidity problems for these others or, worse, the participant's own
failure. The interests of the back office and the systems are consistent:
The systems require certainty in payment order processing which, in
tum, assures that failures to pay will not be caused by bottlenecks in the
back office. In terms of the law, funds transfer systems are interested
in systemic risk reduction methods, such as netting payments obligations, that are enforceable and binding.

B. A Hypothetical Spot Foreign Exchange Trade and Related Foreign Stock Purchase Transactionu
Consider a hypothetical spot dollar-yen transaction in which on day
one a trader at the Bank of Tokyo sells 120 million yen to a trader at
Chemical Bank in exchange for $1 million. The payments obligations-the delivery of 120 million yen to Chemical Bank and of $1
million to the Bank of Tokyo--must settle on day three because of the
two business day settlement convention in the spot foreign exchange
markets. 45 As soon as the deal is completed, the settlements departments ofthe Bank of Tokyo and Chemical Bank are notified of the deal
by the respective traders. 46 In tum, these back offices exchange
information relating to the settlement of the payment obligations such
as bank account numbers held at correspondent banks. 47 Assume that

44. A spot foreign exchange contract involves a commitment by one trader to deliver a
specific quantity of one currency against another trader's commitment to deliver a specific quantity
of a second currency. See WEJSWEJLLER, supra note 23, at 18-19. The deliveries typically occur
within two business days of the contract date. /d. at 19. Of course, the traders enter into such
contracts on behalf of the financial institutions that employ them. It is, therefore, technically
correct to speak of the contracting parties as the trading commercial banks or securities firms, not
the traders.
A foreign stock purchase simply entails buying shares issued and traded on a non-U.S. stock
exchange. The share price is denominated in the currency of the country in which the exchange
is located and must be paid for in that foreign currency. /d. at S-6. Thus, the U.S. purchaser must
ultimately obtain that currency by converting U.S. dollars. /d. The two hypothetical transactions
established below are linked in that the foreign currency obtained in the spot deal is used to
purchase foreign shares.
45. That is, deliveries are made two days after the trade date, here day one. GRABBE, supra
note 32, at 75.
46. KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 35.
47. In a correspondent banking arrangement, which is commonly used to facilitate
international banking transactions, one bank provides payment and other services to another bank.
"Payments through correspondents are often executed through reciprocal accounts (so-called nostro
and vostro accounts), to which standing credit lines may be attached." COMMITIEE OF
GoVERNORS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
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the Bank ofTokyo will pay the $1 million by means of a funds transfer
through either CHIPS or Fedwire and Chemical Bank will pay the 120
million yen by means of a Japanese funds transfer system, the Bank of
Japan Financial Network System (commonly called "BOJ Net"). 48
The Bank of Tokyo trader is likely to deliver the 120 million yen to
Chemical Bank before Chemical Bank pays the $1 million. The reason
for this order of payment is that the funds transfer business dal 9
opens in Tokyo before opening in New York, due to the time zone
difference between the two cities. 50 Assume that the Bank of Tokyo
maintains a correspondent account at First Chicago and the $1 million
are to be credited to that account. Suppose the Bank of Tokyo intends
to use the $1 million to purchase shares in an initial public offering
(IPO) of Singapore Telecom (ST) on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 51
The share price is denominated in Singapore dollars, and the Bank of
Tokyo purchases the shares through its Singapore broker, Smith New
Court (SNC). SNC executes the Bank of Tokyo's buy order using its

COMMUNITY, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES 323 (1992). A nostro account is an
account maintained by one bank at a second bank in another country in the local currency of that
country. This is a vostro account from the second bank's perspective. See KUBARYCH, supra note
32, at 38-39.
48. For an overview of BOJ Net, see BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS
IN ELEVEN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 135 (3d ed. 1989).
49. This is "the part of a day during which the receiving bank is open for the receipt,
processing, and transmittal of payment orders and cancellations and amendments of payment
orders." U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(4). A receiving bank is the "bank to which the sender's instruction
is addressed." /d. § 4A-103(a)(4). A sender is "the person giving the instruction to the receiving
bank." /d. § 4A-103(a)(5). For a payment instruction to qualify as a payment order under Article
4A, certain technical requirements (none of which are in issue here) must be met. /d. § 4A103(a)(l).
50. The same problem arises even if the Bank of Tokyo was paying dollars instead of yen
to Chemical Bank (i.e., if the Bank of Tokyo had bought yen and sold dollars, the converse of the
hypothetical transaction). Dollar transactions in Japan are settled through the Tokyo dollar clearing
system sponsored by the Tokyo branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase Tokyo). BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 48, at 134. Under that system, the Bank ofTokyo and Chemical
Bank would each maintain a bank account at Chase Tokyo. Two steps are required. First, Chase
Tokyo would debit the Bank of Tokyo's account in the amount of$1 million and credit Chemical
Bank's account in that amount. /d. Second, assuming that the net debit balance of the Bank of
Tokyo at the end of the business day was $1 million, this balance would be transferred by Chase
Tokyo to its home office, the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York (Chase New York). Then, the
Bank of Tokyo would settle its $1 million obligation to Chase New York by means of a funds
transfer through CHIPS, which is located in New York. /d. The reason for the second step is that
actual settlement of dollars must ultimately occur in the United States. Chase Tokyo effectively
extends a $1 million overdraft to the Bank of Tokyo which is not covered until CHIPS is open for
business in New York. See id.
51. For present purpqses, it does not matter whether this purchase is on a principal basis (i.e.,
for the Bank of Tokyo's own account) or on an agency basis (i.e., on behalf of a customer).
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own funds and later obtains reimbursement from the Bank of Tokyo. s2
Any delay in settling the $1 million payment obligation arising from
the dollar-yen spot deal has a contagion effect in that it will cause
problems in the ST stock purchase transaction. Receipt of a $1 million
credit by day three is essential if the Bank of Tokyo is to make
payment to SNC for the ST shares in a timely fashion. High speed is
important to SNC because it seeks to minimize its risk exposure by
matching delivery of ST shares against payment of U.S. dollars.s 3
Specifically, until the Bank of Tokyo pays SNC the $1 million, SNC
faces credit, market and currency riskss 4 because it has paid out
Singapore dollars for the ST shares and holds these on its books for the
account of the Bank of Tokyo. SNC's interest is to avoid the scenario
in which it has paid out Singapore dollars from its own account and
received delivery of the ST shares, but has not yet received settlement
in U.S. dollars from the Bank of Tokyo. The longer the sEan of time
between these two events, the greater the risks SNC faces. s There is
a credit risk that the Bank of Tokyo might default on its obligation to
pay for the ST shares because, for instance, the Bank of Tokyo has not
received the $1 million to fund the stock purchase. In that event, SNC
would have to find an alternative purchaser for the ST shares. By that
time, however, the ST share price may have fallen-a market risk-and
consequently there may be nobody willing to buy the ST shares at.the
IPO price that SNC initially paid. There is a currency risk that the
Singapore dollar will appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar between the
time that SNC purchases the shares as agent for the Bank of Tokyo and
the time SNC converts the $1 million reimbursement from the Bank of
Tokyo to Singapore dollars. The appreciation of the Singapore dollar
would reduce or eliminate the effective broker's commission SNC
receives from the Bank of Tokyo. All ofthese risks are mitigated if the
Bank of Tokyo pays SNC promptly. The Bank of Tokyo's ability to
pay promptly in tum hinges on the Bank of Tokyo's timely receipt of
$1 million in its correspondent account at First Chicago.

52. It may rightly be queried whether the Bank of Tokyo's foreign exchange and equity
operations are related in the manner implied by this transaction. The critical point, however, is
that one international financial deal is often linked to a subsequent deal which, in turn, partly
explains the popular conception that different markets are linked.
53. Telephone Interview with Warren Yeh, Vice President, Smith New Court, New York
(June 16, I993). A delivery-versus-payment system would eliminate the risks because the two
events occur simultaneously. It does not exist, however, for Far East equities because there is no
central clearinghouse to clear and settle trades whose members are dealing institutions, like the
Bank of Tokyo, and brokers, like SNC. /d.
54. See JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 2-3, 7.
55. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 23.
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Ill. TRADERS

A. High Speed and a Same-Day Execution Law
Because there is a two-day gap between the trade and value date in
any SfOt foreign exchange deaJ, S6 and an even greater gap in a forward
deal, s a trader assumes the credit risk of its counterparty during the
gap. Ideally, a trader who on day one sells 120 million yen in
exchange for $1 million would like to obtain the $1 million on day one,
and not wait two days for settlement. If settlement occurred on day
one, the risk of the counterparty failing or incurring serious liquidity
problems on days two or three would be irrelevant. The facts in
Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.s 8 illustrate the
problem that every foreign exchange trader faces.
Delbrueck's
settlement obligations on its three foreign exchange contracts with the
Gennan banking partnership Bankhaus J.D. Herstatt, K.G.a.A. were
settled through CHIPS, but Herstatt failed before Delbrueck obtained
settlement from Herstatt. s9
Time zones present an obstacle to immediate and simultaneous
delivery-versus-payment. This obstacle increases the importance of
high speed in settling payments obligations, particularly in situations in
which financial transactions are linked as in the above hypothetical.
Funds transfer law can encourage high speed transfers and minimize
gaps between linked settlements like the yen-U.S. dollar and U.S.
dollar-Singapore dollar obligations.
For example, the same day
execution rule of U.C.C. Article 4A ensures that settlement will occur
on day three and not at a later date: 60 Each receiving bank, other than
a beneficiary's bank,61 must execute62 an accepted 63 payment order
on the day of receipt. 64

56. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. A forward foreign exchange contract is identical to a spot contract except that the date
set for delivery of the underlying currencies is more than two days (generally between one week
and two years) from the date of the contract. See GRABBE, supra note 32, at 76.
58. 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. /d. at 1049-50.
60. U.C.C. § 4A-301(a).
61. The "beneficiary's bank" is "the bank identified in a payment order in which an account
of the beneficiary is to be credited purs11ant to the order .... " /d.§ 4A-103(a)(3). The term is
included within the more generic term "receiving bank." See supra note 49 and accompanying
text. The "beneficiary" is "the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." /d. § 4A-103(a)(2).
62. A receiving bank "executes" a payment order by issuing a payment order "intended to
carry out the payment order received by the bank." /d. § 4A-301(a).
63. "[A] receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order when it
executes the order." /d. § 4A-209(a).
64. /d. § 4A-301(a); see also id. § 4A-301(a) cmt. 2. This assumes that each receiving bank
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Article 4A is not wholly satisfactory, however, because of a littlenoticed rule that allows for a delay in payment by a beneficiary's bank
to the beneficiary. A beneficiary's bank may delay its acceptance 65 of
a payment order until the opening of the funds-transfer business day
following the payment date. 66 There is no obligation to pay the
beneficiary until the order has been accepted. 67 During the period of
delay, the beneficiary's bank can evaluate the credit-worthiness of its
sender while the payment order is in suspended animation. 68 The
purpose of the rule's flexibility is to allow the beneficiary's bank to
minimize the credit risk of its sender. This flexibility comes at the
expense of the beneficiary's interest in rapid payment. Although the
beneficiary's bank does not want to accept a payment order and pay the
beneficiary until the bank receives settlement from its sender, if the
bank delays acceptance it necessarily delays payment to the beneficiary.
A beneficiary's bank, like First Chicago69 in the hypothetical, cannot
prevent or delay acceptance because payment is through Fedwire, 70 but

receives the payment order before its cut-off hour and that no payment order specifies a later
execution date. /d. § 4A-106(a) (relating to the time a payment order is received); id. § 4A-301(b)
(relating to the execution date).
65. Unlike other receiving banks, a beneficiary's bank does not accept a payment order by
executing it. /d. § 4A-30 I (a). Rather, it can accept in one of four ways: (I) paying the
beneficiary, (2) notifying the beneficiary of receipt of a payment order on behalf of the
beneficiary, (3) receiving payment for the entire amount of the order sent by the sender or (4) the
manner described in the following text. /d.§ 4A-209(b). See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying
text for the fourth way a beneficiary's bank can accept a payment order.
66. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3). This is a form of deemed acceptance akin to that in U.N. Model
Law Article 9(1)(h) and (2) because the beneficiary's bank is determined to have accepted the
order by virtue of its failure to reject it within one hour after the opening of the funds-transfer
business day following the payment date. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3). A "funds-transfer business day"
is a day the receiving bank is open for receiving, processing, transmitting, canceling and amending
payment orders. /d.§ 4A-105(a)(4). The "payment date" is "the day on which the amount of the
order is payable to the beneficiary by the beneficiary's bank" and, unless otherwise stated in the
payment order, is "the day the order is received by the beneficiary's bank." /d. § 4A-40l. The
payment date in the hypothetical is day three.
67. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).
68. PATRJKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 62. ·
69. In the hypothetical $1 million funds transfer introduced in Part II.B., supra, the following
U.C.C. Article 4A labels attach to the parties: Chemical Bank is the originator and, possibly, the
originator's bank (see U.C.C. § 4A-104(d)(ii)); First Chicago is the beneficiary's bank; and Bank
of Tokyo is the beneficiary. Any bank standing between Chemical Bank and First Chicago-for
example, a Federal Reserve Bank if Fedwire is used, or a CHIPS correspondent if CHIPS is
used-would be an "intermediary bank." See U.C.C. § 4A-104(b).
70. U.C.C. § 4A-209 cmt. 8 (stating that "[i]n the case of a payment made by Fedwire
acceptance cannot be prevented"). Acceptance by a receiving bank of an order from a Federal
Reserve Bank occurs upon the receipt of the entire amount of the sender's order. /d. § 4A209(b)(2).
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can if the intermediary bank is a Federal Reserve Bank. 71 In that case,
First Chicago could delay acceptance until day four and the Bank of
Tokyo would be paid on that day. The Bank of Tokyo's payment to
SNC could therefore be delayed by one day. To adequately remedy the
problem, U.C.C. Article 4A could be amended to remove the possibility
of delayed acceptance. Another possible remedy is to further limit the
allowed delay period. For example, limiting the period to a few hours,
assuming this is practicable, might be theoretically consistent with the
development of an intra·day funds market. An intra-day funds market
is suggested by recent regulatory developments in the pricing of
daylight overdrafts. 72 Pricing an overdraft of a bank account that lasts
for a few hours and then is covered by a deposit of new funds means
that money has value for periods less than twenty-four hours. One full
·day is traditionally the shortest period for calculating interest. 73
Similarly, limiting the period of delayed acceptance to a few hours
suggests that the funds being Wired have value to the beneficiary on an
hour-by-hour (or minute·by-minute) basis.
From the perspective of the Bank of Tokyo trader the U.N. Model
Law scheme is even less satisfactory than that of the U.C.C. because
delay can occur at any or all points in the funds-transfer chain, not just
at the beneficiary's bank stage. A delay may occur at any point
because of the problem of passing value in the correct amount to the
next party in the funds-transfer chain. On this point the U.N. Model
Law is in need of reform. 74 At the heart of the problem is the
"execution period" concept that allows a receiving bank "one or two
days" to execute a payment order. 75 Although a receiving bank is in
principle obligated to execute a payment order on the day of receipt, the
bank can execute the order on the following day "for value as of the
day of receipt. " 76 This is a practical statutory accommodation to

71. This would occur if CHIPS were used, as it commonly is in the settlement of foreign
exchange transactions. Thus, the delay induced by a section 4A-209(b)(3) acceptance would
persist beyond the CHIPS settlement on day three.
72. See Policy Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,084 (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
1992); Policy Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,093 (Board ofGovemors of Fed. Reserve 1992). For
a discussion of these developments, see PATRJKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 162-67.
It would be harmful to allow a provisional credit, however, because this would undennine the
finality rule of U.C.C. § 4A-405(c).
73. See PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 46 n.29.
74. An interesting issue arises if the U.N. Model Law is adopted by certain states without
necessary changes. Arguably, traders will avoid using funds-transfer systems subject to the U.N.
Model Law because when competition exists between legal regimes, there may be a reverse
Gresham's Law effect. The good legal regime may drive out the bad one because transactors
prefer the beneficial effects (e.g., certainty and predictability) of the good regime.
75. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 2(k).
76. !d. art. II (2).
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banks in countries that cannot process payment orders rapidly. Passing
along value as of the day of receipt raises serious practical concerns,
however, not the least of which is the calculation of value as of the day
of receipt. Presumably an interest rate77 will be applied to the principal value of the payment order for the one-day delay.
The cumulative delay wrought by the U.N. Model Law scheme is
evident if the facts of the hypothetical are expanded. Assume that
Chemical Bank issues a payment order on day three for $1 million to
Chase New York, which executes 78 the order by issuing a conforming
order to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed). 79
The New York Fed executes Chase's order by sending an implementing
order to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Chicago Fed), 80 which
then executes the New York Fed's order by issuing an order to First
Chicago in favor of the Bank of Tokyo. Assume further that each
receiving bank executes the payment order it receives on the day after
receipt for value as of the day received. Chase New York could
execute on day four for value as of day three, the New York Fed could
execute on day five for value as of day four, and the Chicago Fed could
execute on day six for value as of day five.
If the beneficiary's bank (First Chicago) accepts the order on day six,
then Bank of Tokyo has experienced a three day delay in receiving $1
million. Similarly, reimbursement of SNC is delayed and its currency
risk exposure is extended. While the delayed credit to the Bank of
Tokyo's account at First Chicago might include interest compensation
for three days, whether ·the credit must include interest is unclear
because the U.N. Model Law does not specify the liability of a
beneficiary's bank to its customer for delayed payment. The matter is
left to the law governing the relationship between the beneficiary's bank
and the beneficiary. 81 Even if interest is paid, the opportunity cost of
the delay may exceed the interest rate. For example, Bank of Tokyo
might have dedicated the $1 million to a highly profitable investment
in a financial instrument on day three, but by day four adverse price
movements may have eliminated the opportunity. 82 Furthermore, the

77. "Interest" is loosely defined as the interbank rate. /d. art. 2(m).
78. /d. art. 2(1) (definition of "execution").
79. Chase New York and the New York Fed are intermediary banks, i.e., receiving banks
other than the originator's or beneficiary's banks. U.C.C. § 4A-104(b).
80. Assuming Fedwire is used, this is an interdistrict funds transfer. 12 C.F .R. § 21 0.26(f)
(1993).
81. U.N. MODEL LAW art 10(1).
82. Investments in foreign exchange, equities and fixed income securities are examples of
such opportunities in which prices are volatile. See generally A Survey of International Banking,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 10-16, 1993, at 5-14 [hereinafter International Banking Survey] (discussing
volatility in foreign exchange markets, the measurement of potential price changes and various risk
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actual cost of delay may exceed any compensation. SNC is jeopardized
by volatility in the foreign exchange, where dramatic price fluctuations
occur in seconds. 83 If the Singapore dollar appreciates relative to the
U.S. dollar during the one-day delay, SNC will experience a loss when
it converts the reimbursement from the Bank of Tokyo; the "as of'
transfer may not make SNC whole. A more rigorous same-day
execution rule that is simple to administer might well address these
concerns by eliminating the three-day delay and the necessity for
interest compensation. ·
Funds-transfer law is not the only solution to the aforementioned
risks posed by time gaps. In the hypothetical, two ways exist to
minimize the gap between the yen and dollar settlements: Private
contract arrangements and funds-transfer system rules. Under a private
contract arrangement, the Bank of Tokyo can pay yen into an escrow
account and instruct the escrow agent to pay Chemical Bank only when
the agent has received $1 million from Chemical Bank. 84 If the
dollars are not received by the end of day three, then the yen will be
returned. However, this solution involves significant transactions costs.
For each counterparty with which the Bank of Tokyo deals but decides
is not suitably creditworthy to waive an escrow arrangement, the Bank
must negotiate such an arrangement and pay at least a portion of the
escrow fee.
The alternative way to minimize the time gap problem is to amend
the rules of the funds-transfer systems used to deliver the dollars and
yen by extending the hours of operation of each system so that it
overlaps with the other. Recently, the Federal Reserve proposed to
extend the hours of operation ofFedwire to overlap with the trading day
in Tokyo. 85 More generally, the extended hours "could facilitate
efforts to control temporal risk associated with the settlement of crossborder and multi-currency transactions, such as foreign exchange
transactions"86 and "reduc[e] payment system risk in the settlement of
foreign currency and other types of international transactions." 87

management methods).
83. See generally id.
84. The arrangement could involve one escrow agent used by both parties (e.g., a London
agent, whose funds-transfer business day overlaps with that of New York and Tokyo), or two
agents (one for Chemical Bank in Japan to receive yen and one for the Bank of Tokyo in the U.S.
to receive dollars).
85. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,080-83 (proposed Oct. 14, 1992). The proposal called for the Fedwire
to open two hours earlier, at 6:30a.m. Eastern Time (ET) instead of the current 8:30a.m. opening
time.
86. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,082 (proposed Oct. 14, 1992).
87. Notice of Extension ofComment, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,906,61,907 (Dec. 29, 1992).
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Although the Federal Reserve asked for comment on round-the-clock
operation of Fedwire, neither it nor any other central bank appears
ready to implement a funds transfer system that never closes. Indeed,
the Federal Reserve has delayed implementing the earlier opening time
proposal "pending further analysis of the complex issues raised by
commenters."88 Yet, an extension of Fedwire hours may be just what
is needed. A funds transfer system that operates on a twenty-four hour
basis can reduce the credit risks associated with twenty-four hour
trading by minimizing gaps between delivery and payment. Although
the Federal Reserve seems to "especially" appreciate "the role of
Fedwire in enhancing clearance and settlement practices in financial
markets,"89 it has not assumed a leadership role to ensure that twentyfour hour global trading is not constrained because ofFedwire's limited
operating hours.
A related solution in which the Federal Reserve can play a constructive role is the development of a central foreign exchange clearinghouse
akin to the book-entry system used to clear and settle trades in U.S.
government securities. 90 This system would be open all hours of every
day. Heretofore, limited progress toward such a system has been
achieved. 91

B. Low Transactions Costs and Liability for Consequential Damages
"[T]he rules created by law establish implicit prices for different
kinds of behavior, and the consequences of those rules can be analyzed
as the response to those implicit prices."92 Legal rules governing
payment methods are no exception to the principles that every law has
a cost and that microeconomic tools can be used to study the consequences of the law:
Every payment instrument imposes a variety of costs on the parties that use
it. These costs include the financial institution's costs in operating the system,
which the institution will generally transfer to its customers as a direct or

88. 58 Fed. Reg. 40,430 (delay announced July 28, 1993).
89. /d.
90. Transactions in U.S. Treasuries occur through book-entry debits and credits to accounts
maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which effectively acts as a clearing and
settlement system for these securities. Institutions that participate in the private FXNET system
are able to net on a bilateral basis their spot and forward foreign exchange contracts for the same
currencies and value dates. International Banking Survey, supra note 82, at 36. The Exchange
Clearing House Organization (ECHO), in which fourteen European banks participate, allows for
multilateral netting of spot and forward foreign exchange contracts. See id. The two-day gap
between the trade and value dates remains, however, as neither FXNET nor ECHO provides
immediate delivery against payment.
91. See O'BRIEN, supra note 31, at 29-35.
92. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at II (emphasis omitted).
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Indirect charge; the customer's costs of using the instrument, such as the time
and expense spent getting to a financial institution; and the costs imposed by
fraud, forgery, and error losses .... All these costs belong to the economic
category of "transaction costs" because they are attached to an underlying
transaction. This underlying transaction-typically an exchange of goods or
services for value-is beneficial to both parties, but the transaction costs
reduce the value of the exchange, and both parties to the exchange will want
to minimize them. One concept of economic efficiency is achieving a given
end at the minimal cost. 93

Funds transfer law is economically efficient if the payment obligations
arising from a financial market trade is settled at minimal cost. Costs
and the consequent incentives or disincentives these costs create for
financial market players are useful tools in assessing liabilities imposed
by a funds transfer law.
The liability rules on interloper fraud and consequential damages in
a funds transfer law are an important determinant of the cost of funds
transfers. Providers of funds transfer services do not want to absorb the
full cost of such fraud and damages and will price the risk of these
liabilities into their funds transfer fee schedules. 94 In tum, this pricing
will reduce the profitability of financial transactions by narrowing the
spread between the use and cost of funds. Moreover, funds transfers
will be a less attractive means of settling payments obligations arising
from financial transactions, which may result in consideration of
alternative payments mechanisms.
The extent to which traders
substitute such mechanisms for funds transfers will be measured by the
price elasticity of demand, 95 but over time traders are likely to make
adjustments to higher funds transfer service prices. Thus, the demand
for funds transfers will become more price elastic. 96
Assume that in the hypothetical 97 Chemical Bank is free to choose
to pay the Bank of Tokyo by check, cashiers check or funds transfer.
The check is the cheapest alternative, costing thirty-five cents, but poses

93. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 67-68 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
94. See U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmt. 2 ("An originator's bank might be willing to assume additional
responsibilities and incur additional liability in exchange for a higher fee."); see also Hal S. Scott,
The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737, 759-760 (1978) (explaining that banks involved in check
collection compensated for court imposed prohibitions of contractual risk-shifting by increasing
charges to depositors); id. at 784-85 (noting that consumer protection features of laws applicable
to new payments systems has no distributional gain because "banks will charge consumers, through
interest rates or card fees, for the bank's cost in assuming statutorily imposed risks").
95. "Elasticity of demand is a numerical measure of how responsive demand is to changes
in price. It is calculated as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage
change in price." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 29.
96. See id. at 30.
97. See supra part II.B.
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a credit risk from the Japanese bank's perspective. 98 The cashiers
check is the most expensive alternative, costing five dollars, but
eliminates the credit risk problem because the check is drawn both on
and by an acceptable bank. The cost of the funds transfer is more than
thirty-five cents but less than five dollars. Which payments method
should be used by the U.S. bank? The most efficient way of paying for
the yen is the one that creates the greatest surplus in the exchange
which can then be divided between the Chemical Bank and the Bank of
Tokyo. This will be the least costly method. Plainly, the funds transfer
becomes a more appealing payment method to Chemical Bank as the
relative cost of the funds transfer is reduced. 99
This cost is reduced in part by Article 4A's general proscription
against recovering consequential damages from a receiving bank. 100
This statutory fix, however, is incomplete in two respects~ First, a
receiving bank may agree in writing to assume consequential damage
liability, and presumably would do so if it could price the risk of such

98. The present exposition is adapted from an example provided by Professors Cooter and
Rubin. Supra note 3, at 68 n.27.
99. As the hypothetical suggests, assessing the cost of alternative payment methods is,
ultimately, an empirical question. In contrast, forecasting the extent to which alternative legal
rules contribute to those costs is a theoretical exercise where those rules have not yet been
implemented (e.g., the U.N. Model Law) or have been enacted only recently (e.g., U.C.C. Article
4A). For example, will a receiving bank increase the price of the funds transfer services it
provides (and if so, by how much) in the absence of a rule that prohibits the imposition of
consequential damages against the bank without its consent? The answer may depend on an
analysis of the market in which the bank operates: Is the market perfectly competitive, so that the
bank faces a horizontal demand curve and is a price-taker? Nonetheless, the present lack of data
should not bar the formulation of hypotheses about the impact of critical features of the U.N.
Model Law because such hypotheses may be testable in the future.
Of course, transaction costs are not the dispositive factor in choice of payment method. The
funds transfer is by far the fastest method of payment. Funds transfer presents the added
advantages of high security-because of high-technology procedures to safeguard against
fraud-and risk reduction-because of settlement guarantees and netting arrangements provided
through the funds transfer system used. In other words, there are at least three non-price features
of funds transfer that ought to make it a method of payment distinct from other payment
mechanisms: low cost, high speed and high security. See generally U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note.
Nonetheless, lowering the relative cost of a funds transfer enhances its overall comparative
advantage over other payments devices.
Extreme cases of inefficient and unreliable means of making payment demonstrate the
proposition. Consider a countertrade (i.e., barter) transaction where an exporter from a market
economy is paid in goods or services by an importer that is a state-owned enterprise in a nonmarket economy. The exporter is likely to devote considerable attention to the issues of whether
the goods or services it will receive as payment are adequate in quality and value and whether they
are delivered on time. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
865-69 (2d ed. 1991).
100. See U.C.C. § 4A-305(a)-(d).
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liability and charge its sender accordingly. 101 Contracting out of the
proscriptive rule could lead to non-uniformity and "undercut [the]
statute's ability to provide for standard allocations of risk . . . and
preclude economies of scale." 102 Allowing parties to contract out of
the proscription can be justified, however, on the basis that the
competitive effects it induces will result in more efficient risk allocation.103 Moreover, a beneficiary's bank faces statutory liability for
consequential damages if it wrongfully refuses to pay a beneficiary. 104
In these instances, however, the bank acts intentionally with knowledge
of the loss it will cause by refusal to pay; thus the recovery under
U.C.C. Article 4A might resemble the recovery under tort law.
The U.N. Model Law scheme is less satisfactory to financial market
traders than Article 4A. Under the U.N. Model Law scheme, banks
face far greater liabilities and, accordingly, have an increased incentive
to pass on the risk of incurring such liability to funds transfer users. 105
Failure to execute a payment order or improper execution of a payment
order renders a bank liable for any damages provided for under local
law if the bank acted "with the specific intent to cause loss" or
"recklessly and with actual knowledge that loss would be likely to
result." 106 Again the statutory result may resemble that which would
be obtained in tort, but there are two unique uncertainties. First, there
is no limitation of recovery of consequential damages: "[A]ny remedy
that may exist" 107 is a boundless invitation for plaintiffs. Second,
there is no guarantee that litigation will arise in an English-based
common law country, or in a legal system that allows for alternative
pleading of claims. 108 Thus, any imagined similarity between U.C.C.
and tort results may vanish. Moreover, the statute's language allows
even for the imposition of criminal penalties. Here, the suggested
reform is for the U.N. Model Law to specify a remedy for cases of
failure to execute a payment order or improper execution of a payment
order. Alternatively, the U.N. Model Law could allow the parties to
contractually agree on a remedy by means of a liquidated damages
clause or other appropriate device. Either solution would eliminate the
prospect of potentially Draconian and unjustified penalities.
101. ld. § 4A-305(c) & cmt. 2.
102. Scott, supra note 94, at 776; see also infra part V.
103. See Scott, supra note 94, at 776.
104. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).
105. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14, 17, 18.
106. /d. art. 18.
107. /d.
108. Litigation could arise in ajurisdiction in which it is not possible to make claims for relief
under applicable commercial and tort law. For example, perhaps only specific provisions of the
commercial portion of a civil code can be cited.
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IV. SETILEMENTS DEPARTMENTS

A. Certainty, a Receiver Finality Law and a Discharge Law
The settlements department is responsible for the end points of the
funds transfer. When a settlements department implements payment
instructions arising from a trader's purchase of securities, money-market
instruments or foreign exchange, its concern is that the underlying
obligation to pay is discharged. When the trader sells in the market, the
settlements department focuses on receiving final payment from the
buyer. In sum, for the settlements department, a funds transfer law
must provide certainty as to the effect of a funds transfer on the originator and beneficiary.
Laws on receiver finality 109 and discharge 110 are essential in a
funds transfer for the back offices of financial market traders. The
omission of a receiver finality provision from the U.N. Model Law
makes it unacceptable because this omission results in uncertainty as to
when a credit entered into an account as a result of a funds transfer is
irrevocable. The discharge provision is relegated to a footnote with a
heading that appears to make the incorporation of the provision into the
U.N. Model Law even more optional than enacting the Law itself. 111
The legal status of this footnote is a source of additional uncertainty.112 The U.N. Model Law needs a receiver finality rule, and the
status of the discharge rule should be that of any other provision.
Paradoxically, the meaning of uncertainty is not obvious. 113
Uncertainty should not be considered a generic concept, but considered
rather in specific factual contexts. From the perspective of an employee
in the settlements department the relevant questions are: When has my
bank been paid good funds? When has my bank been discharged from

109. The U.C.C. Article 4A receiver finality rule provides that once a beneficiary's bank has
paid the beneficiary, thereby satisfying the bank's obligation to pay the beneficiary arising from
its acceptance of a payment order on behalf of the beneficiary, the payment is final. See U.C.C.
§ 4A-40S(a)-(b). The beneficiary's bank cannot recover the payment. !d. § 4A-40S cmt. 2. The
payment cannot be revoked even if the bank credits the beneficiary's account, but the beneficiary
has not withdrawn the credit. !d. § 4A-40S(c). The receiver finality rule has two exceptions, one
for automated clearing house (ACH) credit transfers and one for a major settlement failure on
CHIPS. See id. § 4A-40S(d)-(e).
110. !d. § 4A-406(a)-(b) contains the discharge rule which provides that an originator is
discharged of its underlying contractual obligation to the beneficiary when the beneficiary's bank
pays the beneficiary which occurs at the time the beneficiary's bank accepts payment. See id.
Ill. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19
112. !d.
113. See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (regarding the "great deal of uncertainty" that existed
before the statute).

n.•••.
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its obligation to pay? Knowing the answers to these questions (or at
least that answers exist) before a trading institution uses a funds transfer
to send $1 million to the seller of 120 million yen reduces uncertainty.
Conversely, the existence of uncertainty requires the trading banks to ·
make decisions based on expected values of outcomes, to consider their
orientation to risk and to possibly insure against risk. 114
The classic microeconomic illustration of decisionmaking under
conditions of uncertainty is to present a business with a choice between
earning a certain sum of profits with certainty or a higher amount with
uncertainty. 11 s The result is that the business must price the risk of
the uncertainty and insure against the undesirable outcome. 116 In the
context of receiver finality and discharge laws, the choice is between
credits of the same amount, but uncertainty as to their status and effect:
(I) an irrevocable credit and certainty about discharge, 117 and (2) a
revocable credit and uncertainty about discharge.
.
Here, too, the rational response involves pricing and insurance. If a
bank selling 120 million yen at an exchange rate of 120.00 yen per
dollar knows that the $1 million credited to its account is revocable,
then it will seek to price the risks that the credit will be revoked and
that it will have to sue the bank buying the yen on the underlying
foreign exchange contract for payment of $1 million. By altering the
dollar-yen spot rate from 120 million yen per $1 million to 119.75

114. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 55-63.
115. See, e.g., id. at 55-70. In the classic example, the business faces a choice of( I) $100,000
with certainty (i.e., a probability of 1.0) if it continues to sell its existing output and (2) $200,000
with uncertainty (i.e., a probability of less than 1.0) if it introduces a new product line. The
choice wiii depend, in part, on the expected monetary value of the two outcomes, which is the
probability of the outcome multiplied by the value of the outcome. /d. at 56-57. Thus, the
expected monetary value of the first decision is $100,000 (the product of $100,000 and 1.0). If
the probability of the second outcome is 0. 75, then the expected value is $150,000. The choice
also will depend on whether the business is risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking. See id. at 5862. The greater the degree of risk aversion, the higher the value the business will place on the first
course of action. See id. at 57.
116. If the business chooses the uncertain path, then it may seek insurance against the risk that
income of $200,000 (or at least some amount greater than $1 00,000) will not be earned. See id.
at 63. Purchasing insurance is one option. Another option is self-insurance, which could entail
setting aside a contingency pool or reserve. /d.
The funds needed to pay for insurance premiums or the funds needed to be placed in the
reserve might be obtained by increasing the price charged to the customers of the business. See
Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 71 (discussing the principle of loss spreading). When this
occurs, the business has priced the risk. From the perspective of the customers, the price increase
is undesirable because their costs have risen. If the output of the business is particularly valued
or needed by society (e.g., health care) then the marginal increase in cost owing to uncertainty is
undesirable from a systemic perspective. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at31-32 (discussing
price inelasticity of demand).
117. See, e.g., V.C.C. §§ 4A-405, -406.
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million yen per $1 million, the selling bank can pnce these risks.
Distorting a market-determined exchange rate on the basis of one
party's perception of settlement finality risk, however, is not practicable
in a deep and liquid market like dollar-yen interbank spot trading. No
single financial institution is likely to have the market power to price
yen differently based on the payments mechanism used.
An economy of scale can be achieved by a statutory receiver finality
rule and certainty of discharge. Indeed, the drafters of U.C.C. Article
4A left clear evidence of their intent to maximize certainty:
A deliberate decision was also made to use precise and detailed rules to assign
responsibility, define behavioral norms, allocate risks and establish limits on
liability, rather than to rely on broadly stated, flexible principles. In the
drafting of these rules, a critical consideration was that the various parties to
funds transfers need to be able to predict risk with certainty, to insure against
risk, to' adjust operationaf.,and security procedures, and to price funds transfer
services appropriately. This consideration is particularly important given the
very large amounts of money that are involved in funds transfers. 118

The two exceptions to the receiver finality rule do not undermine the
rule itself. The first exception, relating to funds transfers involving
automated clearing houses, 119 is relatively narrow and generally
applies to retail payments transactions. The second exception concerns
a major settlement failure in a funds-transfer system that nets payment
obligations on a multilateral basis such as CHIPS. 120 This exception
does not undermine the rule because of its improbability. There are
elaborate settlement guarantee rules designed to prevent the meltdown
that is necessary to trigger the exception. 121 An overt settlement
guarantee from the central bank is unlikely because of the moral hazard
problem it would create. 122 Nonetheless, it is also unlikely that the
Federal Reserve would deny necessary liquidity to net debtor CHIPS

118. /d. § 4A-102 cmt. (emphasis added).
119. These are batch transfers that are substitutes for checks. See id. § 4A-405(d) & cmt. 3.
120. /d. § 4A-405(e) & cmt. 4.
121. See, e.g., Rules Governing the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, rule 13 (as
amended through Sept. 22, 1993) [hereinafter CHIPS Rules].
122. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 65-66 for a discussion of the moral hazard
problem in the insurance context. The moral hazard implications of a settlement guarantee are
apparent. CHIPS participants would have an incentive to incur large net debit positions and
settling participants would have an incentive to incur large net debit positions. See CHIPS Rules,
supra note 121, rule l(f) (definition of "debtor settling participant" & rule l(i) (definition of
"participant"). Settlement risk, and consequently systemic risk, would increase because a debtor
that failed to settle a large debit position would jeopardize the liquidity position of its creditors.
Thus, banking regulators are confronted with the moral hazard problem in attempting to reduce
systemic risk: "Banks' incentives to control the riskiness of their activities could be weakened if
a perception that central banks will absorb risks or take action to limit their systemic consequences
is generated." LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 39, at 9.
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participants (for example, by refusing to make emergency discount
window loans) to ensure settlement if the Federal Reserve believed that
the failure of one or more participants would cause a chain reaction of
settlement failures and deleterious systemic problems. 123 Indeed, the
improbability of the CHIPS meltdown scenario, coupled with the
probability of appropriate Federal Reserve action, strengthens the link
between the base and apex of the inverted pyramid. 124 Traders have
greater confidence in the finality rules and contingency arrangements.
A serious threat to the receiver finality rule is posed by the application of U.C.C. Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions. A Second
Circuit case 125 in which the court held that foreign exchange is a
"good" under Article 2 126 seems correct under a technical reading of
section 2-105 of the U.C.C., but upon further reflection is erroneous.
Foreign exchange represents a credit to a bank account and as such is
a chose in action. 127 A foreign exchange tran~action involves not "the
simultaneous trading of money qua goods," 128 but rather the roughly
contemporaneous exchange of bank credit. Specifically, a credit
denominated in one currency by one party is delivered to the
counterparty's designated bank account in exchange for the delivery of
a credit denominated in a different currency by the counterparty to the
first party's designated bank account. 129 The application of Article 2
gives each side the right of reclamation under section 2-702(2). 130
Yet this result plainly is at odds with the receiver finality rule of U.C.C.
Section 4A-405(c).
Unless the Koreag holding is overturned or the U.C.C. definition of
"good" is modified, 131 every foreign exchange trader within the ambit
of New York's U.C.C. that sells U.S. dollars and receives delivery of

123. Presumably, this is one explanation for the intervention of the Federal Reserve when the
Continental Bank of Illinois faced a liquidity crisis in contrast to the lack of intervention in the
Drexel Burnham Lambert collapse in 1990. For a discussion of the public policy considerations
of government bailouts of a private enterprise, see Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts:
Developing A Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951 (1992).
124. See supra note 2.
125. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
126. Id at 355.
127. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990).
128. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 355.
129. See WEISWEILLER, supra note 23, at 1-2.
130. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 356.
131. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1987). Efforts are currently underway by the American Bar
Association Committee on the U.C.C., Subcommittee on Payments to modifY the definition of
"goods" to exclude funds transfers (materials on file with author). An alternative resolution is the
hub-and-spoke approach suggested by Professor Nimmer, in which one spoke of Article 2 would
apply to foreign exchange transactions. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSE CONTRACTS:
ARTICLE 2 CODE SECTIONS 14 (1993) (on file with author).
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a foreign currency faces the possibility that the counterparty will
reclaim the currency delivered, by revoking the credit in favor of the
trader. The Koreag court held that the remedy of reclamation 132 was
available to Refco, the seller of U.S. dollars deposited in the bank
account of the seller's insolvent counterparty .133 A bank selling
dollars against yen is in precisely the same position as Refco, a prospect
that will unsettle the selling bank's counterparties. 134 The foreseeable
effects of Koreag include increased uncertainty in the foreign exchange
markets whenever one party is potentially subject to New York law and
attempts to price the risks of reclamation under that statute. Perhaps
worse, New York is placed at an international competitive disadvantage
as a center for foreign exchange operations, because parties may take
their business offshore in order to evade the application of Koreag.
The interests of both the settlements department and the trader are
served by receiver finality. Indeed, receiver finality is required because
of the linkages among certain financial transactions. For example, in
the hypothetical introduced in Part II.B. the U.S. dollar-Japanese yen
spot foreign exchange deal is followed by a U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar
conversion which is then followed by the ST share purchase. A trader
expecting a credit of funds from one deal who intends to commit those
funds in a second deal needs the credit to be irrevocable. Thus, the
Bank of Tokyo not only requires timely delivery of $1 million on day
three, but requires final payment as well because it intends to purchase
ST shares immediately. 135
B. Certainty, Payment Order Processing Laws and a Money-Back
Guarantee
The settlements department is focused not only on the end points of
the funds transfer, but also on its own duties in handling payment
instructions. 136 Routine methods of processing a large volume of
payment orders in a short period of time, and black letter rules for
132. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
133. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 356-57.
134. In other transactions with the insolvent counterparty, Refco was a buyer of foreign
currency (like a bank purchasing yen). /d. at 357. Unlike the seller's remedies, the buyer's rights
under Article 2 do not undermine the Article 4A finality rule because the buyer's remedies do not
include reclamation. See U.C.C. § 2-711. If a seller breaches, the buyer can cancel the contract
and refuse to pay. /d. § 2-711(1). The other remedies available to buyers require goods to be
"identified." /d. § 2-711(2)(a). Bank credits are typically a fungible bulk chose in action in a
designated account and are not segregated or identifiable.
135. Accordingly, an argument that receiver finality is unnecessary if payment is made as of
a certain value date fails because it views one financial market transaction in isolation from other
related deals.
136. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 23, 35.
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dealing with mishaps in directing payment orders and completing funds
transfers, are essential if the deals negotiated by traders are to be
properly executed in a timely fashion. Rules that require human
intervention and the exercise of discretion impede the development of
rapid, automated payment order processing systems. 137
The interests of the first and second levels of the inverted pyramid
converge here. The interest of the settlements department of a bank in
certainty coalesces with the interests of the trading department of that
bank in high speed and low transactions costs. Human payment order
processing and judgment calls are time-consuming and expensive. 138
This similarity of interests is important because it contributes to risk
reduction. The obvious benefit from a funds transfer law that engenders
rapid payment order processing is the reduction of settlement risk. 139
Risk exposure is extended as payment order processing is slowed
because the creditor institution must wait longer for settlement from its
counterparty.
The less apparent benefit of rapid payment order
processing involves market risk. The larger the volume of trading
activity the more likely it is that the positions taken by different traders
in the same institution will offset or hedge one another, thereby
reducing market risk. 140 The London branch of a U.S. bank may have
a net long position in yen, while the Tokyo branch of the same bank
may have a net short position. From the perspective of the New York
headquarters of the bank-as well as that of the Federal Reserve
examiners who check the market risk to which the bank as a whole is
exposed-these offsetting positions are healthy because the bank is at
least partially hedged against a quick appreciation or depreciation in the
value of yen against major currencies.
Finally, the trading and settlements departments' common interests
in rapid, low cost systems have a practical dimension: generating larger
profits from increasing trading volumes. Back offices must cope with
a large volume of payment orders generated by the traders' financial
deals while not stifling trading activity. No trader wants to learn that
increasing trading activity volumes and the opportunity for increased
profits (as well as individual bonuses) cannot be accommodated because
"the plumbing is clogged." In the worst case, the number of deals a
. trader can enter into each funds-transfer business day will be determined by the number of payment orders the back office can process.

137. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2 (explaining the high-speed, automated means for processing
payment orders).
138. /d. § 4A-207 cmt. 2.
139. See supra notes II, 51-57 and accompanying text.
140. See JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 17.
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The payment order processing rules of U.C.C. Article 4A that allow
receiving banks to rely on account numbers instead of names should be
weighed against the above considerations. 141 Whether the computers
that handle payment orders can process figures or words more quickly
is a technological issue. The legal right to rely on one or the other,
however, facilitates automated processing. This is particularly true
when it is coupled with the absence of a duty to check for mismatches
between account names and numbers in a payment order. 142
The U.N. Model Law, in contrast, provides no unequivocal statement
that a receiving bank is free to rely on an account number. 143 For the
interests of the back offices to be met, the U.N. Model Law must be
amended to include the rules of U.C.C. sections 4A-207(b) and 4A208(a)(l), which provide necessary guidance! 44 The amendment is
urgently needed in light of the liability of a beneficiary's bank for
misdirected payment orders. 145 The originator, not the bank, is in the
best position to insure that the name and account number of the
beneficiary stated in a payment order are correct because the originator
received payment instructions from the beneficiary. 146 To place the
onus for consistency between name and number on the beneficiary's
bank without clarifying that the bank has no duty to check for inconsistencies is an inefficient allocation.
Settlements departments in receiving banks that detect problems in a
payment order should not have a statutory duty to notify senders of the
problematic payment orders. The U.N. Model Law errs by making
receiving banks insurers against "insufficient data" in a payment
order 147 and "inconsistenc[ies] in the information relating to the

141. A beneficiary's bank that is unaware of a mismatch between the name and account
number of the beneficiary in the payment order received by the bank is free to rely on the number
and need not determine whether the name and number identify the same party. U.C.C. § 4A207(b)(l).
142. See id. §§ 4A-207(b) (applicable to a beneficiary's banks) & 208(a)(l) (applicable to a
receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank). See also id. § 4A-207 cmt. 2.
143. Compare U.N. MODEL LAW arts. 8 & 10 (differing treatment ofreceiving banks' ability
to rely on identifying account number) with U.C.C. §§ 4A-207 & 4A-208.
144. Essentially, the U.C.C. rules allow a receiving bank to process payment orders based
solely on account numbers specified in the orders. U.C.C. §§ 4A-207(b), -208(a)(l ). These
sections also make clear that the bank has no duty to examine orders for inconsistencies between
the account numbers and the account names. /d. §§ 4A-207(b), -208(a)(l).
145. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 10(4).
146. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. For example, the International Swap Dealers Association
(ISDA) Master Agreement and the Foreign Exchange Committee International Currency Options
(ICOM) Agreement call upon the parties to exchange payment instruction information in the
schedules attached to the agreements. See ISDA Master Agreement (unpublished document, on
file with author) & ICOM Master Agreement (unpublished document, on file with author).
147. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 8(4) (applicable to a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's
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amount of money to be transferred." 148 The efficient way for a settlements department to handle such orders is rejection: put simply, if the
sender cannot get it right, then the receiving bank should not have to
investigate up the funds transfer chain. The U.N. Model Law requirement that a receiving bank notify an identifiable sender of insufficiencies and inconsistencies 149 compares unfavorably with the U.C.C.
Article 4A scheme. In U.C.C. Article 4A, the intentional manipulation
of the concept of acceptance by a beneficiary's bank releases prior
senders from their obligations to pay for payment orders. 150
The U.C.C. Article 4A laws are not self-contained, however, and
create a moral hazard problem for those who originate payment orders.
Allocating the loss to a beneficiary's bank that pays a beneficiary when
the bank is aware ofa name-account number mismatch in the payment
order is efficient because the bank is plainly able to prevent payment to
an unintended beneficiary by rejecting the order in the first place. The
beneficiary's bank must proceed against an unintended beneficiary that
it paid to get funds back, but the applicable law may be unclear and
may vary across jurisdictions. The originator has no incentive to ·
exercise any level of care in designating the name and account number
· of the beneficiary when it issues its payment order because "Article 4A
makes irrelevant the issue of whether [the originator] was or was not
negligent in issuing its payment order."ISI
A more subtle scenario further illustrates the potential difficulties
presented by U.C.C. Article 4A. Only an originator that is a "bank" is
expected to understand "how payment orders are processed and
paid. " 152 An originator issuing a payment order with an inconsistent
designation of the beneficiary is not liable to pay for the order unless
the receiving bank served prior notice that it would rely on the account
number in the payment order. 153 The dividing line between banks and
bank); see also id. art. 10(2) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank).
148. /d. art. 8(5) (applicable to a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank); see also
id. art. 10(4) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank).
149. ld. arts. 8(4)-(5) (applicable to a receiving bank other than a beneficiary's bank) & 10(2)(4) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank). Notice must be provided only if the sender can be
identified. /d. art. 8(4)-(5).
ISO. Under U.C.C. § 4A-207(b)(2), if a beneficiary's bank receives a payment order and
knows that the name and account number of the beneficiary do not match, but nevertheless pays
the beneficiary, then no acceptance occurred. U.C.C. § 4A-207(b)(2). Because acceptance is the
event that triggers a sender's obligation to pay for its order under U.C.C. § 4A-402(b), the sender's
obligation does not mature. /d. § 4A-402(b). In turn, because the beneficiary's bank did not
accept the order, the money-back guarantee of U.C.C. § 4A-402(c) assures each prior sender of
a credit to the sender's account. ld. § 4A-402(c)-(d).
151. /d. § 4A-207 cmt. 2.
152. ld. § 4A-207 cmt. 3.
153. Id. § 4A-207(c)(2).
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non-banks, however, is not made much clearer by the definition of
"bank" in U.C.C. Section 4A-105(a)(2). 154 Thus, the scope of
application of the rule is uncertain.
A money-back guarantee assures the settlements department that an
incomplete funds transfer is not a black hole. 155 Without the guarantee, the risk of losing funds must be priced and incorporated into the
overall transaction costs associated with settling a payments obligation
that arises from a purchase of securities, money-market instruments or
foreign currency. Alternatively, a contractual way to efficiently allocate
the risk must be used. The statutory rule yields economies of scale by
removing the need to resort to a contract on each settlement.
While the guarantee in U.C.C. Article 4A is unequivocal, the
language of the Model Law on this point results in uncertainty: The
money-back guarantee "may not be varied by agreement except when
a prudent originator's bank would not have otherwise accepted a
particular payment order because of a significant risk involved in the
credit transfer." 156 The italicized terms render the rule hopelessly
unworkable. Even the best expert witnesses from the leading. central
banks are unlikely to agree either on "prudence" or on whether the risk
(of unspecified type) was "significant." The U.C.C. Article 4A
guarantee should be the model for the U.N. Model Law to better serve
the interests of the players at the second level of the inverted pyramid.

C. Interloper Fraud and the Efficient Allocation of Risk
Modem day electronic pirates abound and threaten the integrity ofthe
system for settling payment obligations arising from financial market
trading. The back office is both a receiver and a sender of payment
orders generated by trading activity. 157 In each role, the back office's
interest is the efficient allocation of liability in the event a pirate is
successful in electronically raiding a bank account. A security

154. The definition of bank is "a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a
savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union and trust company. A branch or separate
office of a bank is a separate bank for purposes of this Article." /d. § 4A-1 05(a)(2). ·
155. Each sender of a payment order is entitled to a credit with interest of any funds paid for
its order if the funds transfer is not completed; a transfer is completed only if the beneficiary's
bank accepts an order for the beneficiary. See id. §§ 4A-402(c), -104(a). Only a sender that
designates an intermediary bank which subsequently fails loses this protection. /d. § 4A-402(e).
156. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(2) (emphasis added).
157. The settlements department receives orders after trades are made, and it executes the
orders by issuing conforming payment orders. U.C.C. § 4A-30l(a) (providing the definition of
"execution" for a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank).
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procedure 158 to verify the authenticity of payment orders is the antipiracy device. 1s9
It is a clerk in the back office and not a trader seated on the trading
floor who deals with the pirate and who, therefore, must sort out bona
fide payment orders from payment orders of pirates. As a receiver, the
settlements department wants a security procedure to provide the
necessary sorting. Conversely, a sender that fails to take precautions to
protect its payment order transmission mechanisms is likely to be
charged an extra fee by the receiving banks to which it issues payment
orders. These banks will price the risk of interloper fraud and pass this
cost back to the sender. Accordingly, a "commercially reasonable"
security procedure 160 both affords protection to the settlements department as a sender and reduces the receiving bank's incentive to increase
its funds transfer service fees to insure against interloper fraud loss. 161
There is no comparative negligence analysis under the U.N. Model
Law 162 or U.C.C. Article 4A. 163 Either the innocent customer or the

158. /d. § 4A-201. The term used in the U.N. Model Law is "authentication." U.N. MODEL
LAW art. 2(i).
159. The significance ofinterloper fraud rules also are apparent from the back office's interest
in certainty. As a receiver, the instructions the back office receives to transfer funds after a trader
purchases securities, money market instruments or foreign exchange must be bona fide.
Uncertainty is costly: receiving banks will seek to increase the prices they charge for accepting
payment orders from their customers. This price increase will represent an increase in transaction
costs because the cost of satisfying payment obligations such as the delivery of $1 million in a
dollar-yen spot foreign exchange agreement rises. Such an increase in transaction costs is
inconsistent with the macroeconomic aim of accommodating a growing volume of financial
transactions. A security procedure designed to test the authenticity of payment orders issued by
a sender to a receiving bank reduces uncertainty. The need to incorporate into the price of funds
transfer services the risk of liability for interloper fraud is correspondingly lessened.
160. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)-(c); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 5(2)(a).
161. The fee schedule of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York illustrates the point. The fee
for originating a funds transfer is fifty-three cents per transfer if the originator uses the On-Line
Security Procedure, which incorporates an electronic computer transmission. If the originator uses
the Off-Line Security Procedure, however, the transfer fee is $10.00 per transfer. FED. REsERVE
BANK OF N.Y., FUNDS TRANSFERS THROUGH FEDWIRE, OPERATING CIRCULAR NO. 8, at App. A
(Jan. I, 1991), App. E (Jan. I, 1993).
162. Under the U.N. Model Law, liability initially is allocated to the purported sender. A
purported sender is bound by a payment order issued in its name (and, therefore, must pay for the
order) if the authentication "is in the circumstances . . . commercially reasonable" and the
receiving bank complied with the security procedure. U.N. MODEL LAw art. 5(2)(a). As a second
step, liability can be reallocated to the receiving bank. /d. art. 6. The purported sender-who is,
after all, an innocent customer of the receiving bank-can shift liability back to the receiving bank
if it proves that the fraud was not perpetrated by an insider. /d. art. 5(4). The receiving bank,
however, can rebut this not-an-insider defense and again place liability on the purported sender
by showing that the purported sender acted with fault. /d. The U.N. Model Law states that the
defense does not apply "if the receiving bank proves that the payment order resulted from the
actions of a person who had gained access to the authentication procedure through the fault of the
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receiving bank bears the full loss. In designing a loss allocation rule,
three principles of economic efficiency are relevant: 164 loss spreading, 165 loss reduction 166 and loss imposition. 167 The object is to

purported sender." /d. In sum, liability is all-or-nothing and is determined using a ping-pong
procedure.
163. The Article 4A rules are summarized as follows:
In a large percentage of cases, the payment order of the originator of the funds transfer
is transmitted electronically to the originator's bank. In these cases it may not be
possible for the bank to know whether the electronic message has been authorized by
its customer. To ensure that no unauthorized person is transmitting messages to the
bank, the normal practice is to establish security procedures that usually involve the use
of codes or identifying numbers or words. If the bank accepts a payment order that
purports to be that of its customer after verifying its authenticity by complying with a
security procedure agreed to by the customer and the bank, the customer is bound to
pay the order even if it was not authorized. But there is an important limitation on this
rule. The bank is entitled to payment in the case of an unauthorized order only if the
court finds that the security procedure was a commercially reasonable method of
providing security against unauthorized payment orders. The customer can also avoid
liability if it can prove that the unauthorized order was not initiated by an employee or
other agent of the customer having access to confidential security information or by a
person who obtained that information from a source controlled by the customer . . . .
If the bank accepts an unauthorized payment order without verifying it in compliance
with a security procedure, the loss falls on the bank.
U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note 28 U.L.A. 461-62 (1989) (emphasis added). The rules are set forth
in U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to -204.
As discussed above, there are three critical steps in analyzing this legal scheme: the agreement,
commercial reasonability and the not-an-insider defense.
164. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70.
165. The loss spreading principle states that liability for loss due to fraud should be assigned
to the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest cost. /d. at 71. A definition of risk
aversion is that "a person is said to be [] risk averse if she considers the utility of a certain
prospect of money income to be higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal
expected monetary value." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 58. A risk averse person facing a
possible loss will pay more than the average value of the loss to eliminate the risk of the loss.
Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70-71. A person who is indifferent between a certain prospect
of money income and an uncertain prospect of money income of equal expected monetary value
is risk neutral. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 62. In the context of losses, a risk neutral
person places a value on risk equal to the average value of the loss. Cooter & Rubin, supra note
3, at 71.
166. There are four aspects of loss reduction: precaution, innovation, responsiveness and
learning. LiabilitY should be assigned to the party that is: (I) able to adopt precautionary
measures against loss at the lowest cost; (2) most likely to develop innovative methods of
precaution over time; (3) influenced by the assignment ofliability; and (4) most able to learn about
its liabilities and adopt its behavior accordingly. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 73, 84.
"Precaution" means adopting safeguards against loss. /d. at 73-74. "Innovation" refers to
precaution in a dynamic context in which a party develops new ways of reducing loss based on
technological breakthroughs. /d. at 74-75. Assigning liability to a party whose behavior in terms
of precaution or innovation is not influenced by the assignment is economically unjustifiable. /d.
at 75. "Responsiveness" is the economic way of thinking about Skinnerian behavior modification
(i.e., stimulus-response). /d. at 75. "Learning" places responsiveness in a dynamic context: In
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devise a loss allocation rule consistent with the recommendations that
result from the application of these principles to specific facts. 168
With respect to loss spreading, there are two reasons that financial
institutions are more likely than individual customers to achieve risk
neutrality. Financial institutions have greater economic resources 169
and they can spread the loss more effectively. 170 Accordingly, the
loss spreading principle yields the practical recommendation that fraud
losses should be placed on banks. 171 This recommendation ignores
other factors and principles and was formulated in the context of
consumer payment methods like checks. 172 It cannot, therefore, be
accepted in the funds transfer context. The typical user of funds
transfer services is a large financial institution. A loss from fraud,
therefore, may be a small percentage of its wealth and such losses may
be predictable. In the context of the hypothetical described in Part
II.B., Chase Manhattan does not necessarily have a comparative
advantage over Chemical Bank in spreading loss. This is an empirical
issue incapable of a priori resolution. Thus, an unequivocal recommendation about loss allocation from interloper fraud cannot be based on
the loss spreading principle. Whether the initial allocation of liability
under the U.N. Model Law to the purported sender is efficient turns on
the principles of loss reduction and loss imposition.
On balance, the application of the four elements of loss reduction 173
to the problem of interloper fraud in funds transfers does not result in
a straight measuring stick with which to evaluate the U.N. Model Law
scheme. 174 The hypothetical of Part II.B. can be used to illustrate.
Whether Chemical Bank or Chase Manhattan can adopt precautionary
measures at a lower cost is not prima facie clear. Conventional analysis
states that "[t]he precaution element is unrelated to the size and nature

the long run, a party will learn about the potential liability it faces and conform its behavior to the
law. !d. at 75-76.
167. While the focus of the loss spreading and loss reduction principles is on assigning
liability, the focus of the loss imposition is on enforcement of the assigned liability. !d. at 78.
"To achieve efficiency ... the enforcement process should be as inexpensive as possible." /d.
Liability rules that are simple, clear and decisive increase efficiency because they shift liability to
the appropriate party with minimal litigation costs. !d.
168. /d. at 84.
169. I.e., the losses are small in proportion to their wealth. /d. at 71.
170. I.e., the losses are small and predictable. /d. at 71-72.
171. /d. at 71-72, 84.
172. !d. at 71, 84.
173. The elements are precaution, innovation, responsiveness and learning. See supra note
166.
174. This is not surprising, as Professors Cooter and Rubin point out that even in the consumer
payments context the loss reduction principal "is generally neutral between financial institutions
and consumers." Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 84.
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of the party; its detennining factor is the party's position in the payment
transaction." 175 Accordingly, the fact that Chemical Bank and Chase
Manhattan are roughly equal-sized giants should not obfuscate matters.
Moreover, the conventional analysis is easier to apply to situations
where only one party is involved in a payments activity 176 than to the
issuance and acceptance of a payment order, which plainly involves a
sender and a receiving bank.
Indeed, the situation is one of bilateral precaution: both parties can
adopt safeguards at low cost, and more data are needed to detennine
which of the two parties has the greater capacity for precaution. An
additional problem is that such data are static, while the relative
capacities of the parties are likely to change as the financial health of
the parties alters. These problems suggest that liability should be faultbased, as it is in the U.N. Model Law, because the paradox of precautions is avoided. 177
Evaluated in these tenns, the U.N. Model Law scheme is efficient.
The sender has an incentive to avoid losses because, if the receiving
bank complies with a commercially reasonable security procedure that
has been agreed to, the sender is liable. 178 The sender presumably
takes care to monitor employees and other insiders, and to keep secure
its wire room wherein confidential infonnation about the authentication
device is stored. The receiving bank also has an incentive to avoid
losses. The receiving bank cannot retain funds it debited from the
purported sender's account to pay for a payment order if it did not
comply with the procedure or the procedure was not commercially
reasonable. 179
Examination ofthe innovation and responsiveness elements indicates
that, in contrast to the precaution element, they do correlate with the

175. /d. at 76 (footnote omitted).
176. E.g., a bank encoding a check or a drawer handing a check to another party.
177. The paradox is that "[a]ny fault rule, including simple negligence, negligence with a
contributory negligence defense, and comparative negligence, will motivate one party to satisfy
the legal standard of fault in order to avoid liability, while inducing the other party to take
precaution because it must bear any residual responsibility for the loss." Cooter & Rubin, supra
note 3, at 74 (footnote omitted). As Professors Cooter and Rubin point out, "[b)ilateral precaution
characterizes most false positive situations[]" (wherein an invalid payment instruction such as a
forged check is followed). /d. at 89. Whether the capped consumer liability rule is appropriate
in the wholesale funds transfer context is debatable. See id. at 90, 97. The "consumers" in this
context are sophisticated financial institutions and the law of diminishing returns on responsiveness
with increases in liability may not apply until a high minimum threshold of liability is reached.
Of course, a separate issue that must be considered is the cost of determining fault in a fault-based
system.
178. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5(2).
179. /d.
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size and nature of the parties. 18 Financial institutions are more likely
than consumers to innovate and respond to legal incentives. 181
Analysis of these elements does little to assist in the determination of
risk allocation in the funds transfer context, because it is unclear which
party is most likely to develop innovative methods of precaution over
time. Applied in the context of consumer payment methods, the data
suggest financial institutions are more likely to research, develop and
In the funds
implement high-technology, anti-fraud devices. 182
transfer context, the sending bank seems no less likely to spawn better
authentication devices than the receiving bank.
Analysis of the responsiveness element also yields an unsatisfactory
result. In the hypothetical transaction, both Chemical Bank and Chase
Manhattan are likely to be armed with legal teams and compliance
officers, capable of rapidly digesting a new funds transfer law and
altering behavior accordingly. 183 Whether one is in a better position
to respond than the other is prima facie unclear, although the situation
is probably one of bilateral responsiveness. This seems also to be the
case with respect to the learning element.
The loss imposition principle suggests that the fault rule in the U.N.
Model Law is inefficient. Strict liability, as opposed to fault-based
liability, is simple, clear and decisive. 184 Strict liability is also cheaper to implement because it generates less civil discovery and motion
practice. 185 Strict liability, however, is not the result suggested by the
bilateral precaution analysis. 186
The bottom line is that the U.N. Model Law scheme for allocating
loss is consistent with the precautionary element of the loss reduction
principle and at odds with the loss imposition principle. Application of
the loss reduction principle yields this inconclusive result in the funds
transfer context primarily because the typical senders and receiving
banks are similar: both categories are populated by large financial
institutions trading foreign exchange, money-market instruments and
securities. The principle can be applied more simply to consumer
payment methods like checks and credit cards because the users and
providers of the payments services have distinct attributes that produce
clear differences in actual and potential abilities. The conventional

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 77.

/d.
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 76-77.
id. at 81.
id. at 74.
id. at 78-79, 85.
supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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analysis does not necessarily lack merit, but more facts are needed. 187
Specifically, more facts about the size, nature and position of the
senders and receiving banks are needed for a full analysis.
V. FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS

A. Systemic Risk and Variation by Agreement
To serve the interests of financial market players, funds transfer law
must address their systemic concerns. Yet, funds transfer law ostensibly
has little to say about systemic risk. The term "systemic risk" is not
used in U.C.C. Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. If, however, funds
transfer systems are to develop innovative methods of systemic risk
reduction, the legal status of the system and its rules should be clear.
Such clarity would enable system participants to implement systemic
risk reduction efforts in an environment of greater legal certainty.
Moreover, funds transfer law should allow for variation by agreement
by system rules.
A critical defect of the U.N. Model Law is that it does not appropriately recognize the existence of funds transfer systems and their
rules. Indeed, the U.N. Model Law fails to define the term "funds
transfer system." Whether a funds transfer system rule can bind nonparticipant third parties or whether it can vary inconsistent provisions
of the U.N. Model Law are unresolved issues.' 88 Whether the fruits
of systemic risk reduction efforts of the participants in a funds transfer
system can be realized also is unclear.
The neglect is not a result of ignorance. The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) delegates plainly
were aware of the existence of funds transfer systems: The term is used
once in the U.N. Model Law. Article 14(6) deals with the "skip rule"
problem of an intermediary bank's failure coupled with an incomplete
credit transfer. 189 UNCITRAL delegates may have chosen to otherwise ignore funds transfer systems deliberately. The delegates may
have feared that an express recognition of Fedwire, CHIPS and other
funds transfer systems in developed countries would result in a
competitive advantage to these existing systems. If the U.N. Model

187. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 84.
188. Compare U.C.C. § 4A-50l(b) with U.N. MODEL LAW art. 4.
189. Generally, a bank obligated to make a refund pursuant to the money-back guarantee can
skip over a failed intermediary bank and pay a prior sender directly. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(4).
The exception to this rule applies if the bank's rights or obligations under the rules of a funds
transfer system in which the bank participates would be affected. /d. art. 14(6).
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Law recognized these funds transfers systems-and allowed them to
vary the U.N. Model Law by contract-financial market players would
choose to use Fedwire and CHIPS. This choice by UNCITRAL
delegates is unfortunate, because the systems are well-established. The
U.N. Model Law should acknowledge that Fedwire and CHIPS are
significant money movers.
In contrast, funds transfer systems are hardly ghosts in Article 4A.
In Article 4A the legal status of system rules is clear: System rules
governing participants may be effective even if they conflict with
Article 4A. 190 Moreover, the third-party problem is resolved. A
funds transfer system rule is effective even if it both conflicts with
Article 4A and affects non-consenting parties, and the rule may govern
the rights and obligations of non-participants. 191 Systemic risk is the
reason for certain provisions in Article 4A 192 and the CHIPS
Rules. 193 The object of those provisions is to support funds transfer
system rules that deal with systemic risk. Whether this is also the case
with article 14(6) of the U.N. Model Law is unclear because the skip
rule problem is a limited one with little systemic dimensions.
Professor Scott's explanation that "parties to a transaction may accept
optional statutory provisions . . . because the cost of contracting out of
them is greater than the efficiencies that might be achieved through
such variation[]" 194 must be supplemented. The analysis of optional
rules need not be limited to a cost-benefit calculation, but should be
expanded to include the innovation element of the loss reduction
principle identified by Professors Cooter and Rubin. 195 Through
funds transfer system rules, 196 a funds transfer system can implement
methods of precaution over time to reduce losses associated with
systemic risk. A necessary prerequisite, however, is that the legal

190. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b).
191. /d.
192. See, e.g., id. § 4A-405.
193. CHIPS rule 13, which sets forth a settlement guarantee mechanism, is such a rule.
CHIPS Rules, supra note 121, rule 13. If one or more CHIPS participants fail to settle their net
debit positions, then the remaining solvent participants will contribute appropriate amounts to
effect settlement. /d. U.C.C. section 4A-405(e) applies if the CHIPS settlement guarantee
algorithm is unsuccessful and an unwind of positions is required. Article 4A allows an exception
to the receiver finality rule in this instance. U.C.C. § 4A-405 cmt. 4. To be sure, these provisions
were drafted in consultation with the Federal Reserve.
194. Scott, supra note 94, at 739.
195. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 73-77.
196. This is "a rule of an association of banks (i) governing transmission of payment orders
by means of a funds-transfer system of the association or rights and obligations with respect to
those orders, or (ii) to the extent the rule governs rights and obligations between banks that are
parties to a funds transfer in which a Federal Reserve Bank, acting as an intermediary bank, sends
the payment order to a beneficiary's bank." U.C.C. § 4A-501(b).
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regime in which the system operates encourages participants in the
system to generate new risk-reduction ideas and guarantees the legal
enforceability of funds transfer system rules. If two or more systems
operate in the same or similar markets (as do CHIPS and Fedwire),
there is a potential for healthy competitive variation in risk-reduction
measures implemented through different funds transfer system rules.
Interestingly, systemic risk reduction programs involving the central
bank may raise a moral hazard problem. The Federal Reserve has
never expressly committed to providing liquidity to CHIPS to ensure
settlement finality. While it is inconceivable that appropriate support
would not be forthcoming, this does not mean that discount window
loans will be made to troubled CHIPS participants. 197 If financial
market transactors know with certainty that their counterparties will be
bailed out, then there is no incentive to evaluate the credit risk of those
counterparties or attempt privately negotiated risk-reduction arrangements. Bilateral and multilateral netting schemes are such riskreduction arrangements; it is not surprising that the Federal Reserve has
looked on these with favor. From the bank regulator's perspective
funds transfer law should, therefore, accommodate the development of
netting schemes.
B. Trade-D.ffs

The difficulty with the Article 4A approach to funds transfer systems
is that it fails to resolve underlying trade-offs between private rules and
statutory law and, more fundamentally, between freedom of contract
and legal compulsion. Suppose that Article 4A was completely variable
by agreement. 198 There would be no limits on the systemic risk
reduction efforts of funds transfer system participants or on the
competitive variation of rules in different systems. Two adverse
consequences follow from the legal protection of private rules. First,
risk fixing 199 could result, and public law would be needed to control
risk allocation between banks and customers. One must distinguish

197. The failure of the Federal Reserve to lend to Drexel Burnham Lambert is a case in point.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
198. The non-uniform provision in section S-102(4) ofNew York's U.C.C. is analogous to this
supposition. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1994). The account party
and issuing bank in a letter of credit transaction are free to opt out of Article S in favor of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits. 1NT'L CHAMBER OF CoM.,
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DocUMENTARY CREDITS (1984).
199. Professor Scott rightly characterizes risk fixing as functionally equivalent to price fixing.
HAL S. SCOTT, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITTEE OF THE
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 35-36 (1978) (hereinafter
3-4-8 REPORT).
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between users and consumers when discussing risk allocation.
Although risk allocation between banks and customers in the context of
consumer payment systems may be needed, in the funds transfer context
it may not. Participants in a funds transfer system are both users and
providers of the system's services. A more ominous possible result of
fixed risk allocation is tacit collusion among funds transfer systems to
allocate risks among participants and thereby minimize competition
among systems.
The second adverse consequence of legal protection of private rules
is that economies of scale in risk allocation might be lost. Assume that
participants are free to vary the money-back guarantee by agreement.
Although this assumption is at odds with the current Article 4A
rule, 200 it would provide greater certainty than that afforded under the
U.N. Model Law. 201 Payment orders would have to be sorted into
two categories: those orders whose senders had agreed by contract to
waive the guarantee and those whose senders contractually elected to
be covered by the guarantee. 202 Operating two payment order processing systems would be expensive and jeopardize economies of
scale. 203 Ideally, the cost of operating two systems should be allocated to those senders who opt for the guarantee on the grounds that it
would not otherwise be offered. 204 Eliminating the ability of parties
to vary Article 4A would avoid the marginal cost of two systems, allow
the cost of one system to be spread evenly among all users and assure
economies of scale.
The trade-offs become more difficult to resolve when the Federal
Reserve is considered in its roles as both a funds transfer system
sponsor and a regulator of participants in competitor systems. 205 As
long as Federal Reserve Banks offer a priced service that competes with
one offered by private sector players that it regulates, a potential
conflict of interest exists between these roles. 206
Even if Fedwire were privatized by being sold to commercial banks
to operate, freedom of contract would be illusive. 207 As the statute

200. U.C.C. § 4A-402(f).
201. The U.N. Model Law contains problematic language in the money-back guarantee
provision. See U.N. MODEL LAw art. 14(2).
202. See Professor Scott's analysis in the context of check collection and the risk of loss from
a forged drawer's signature in 3-4-8 REPORT, supra, note 199, at 40-41.
203. Id.
204. Indeed, as a participant in the drafting of Article 4A, the Author noted that the moneyback guarantee appeared to be the protection obtained by large corporate users of funds transfer
services in return for agreeing to a limit on the liability of banks for consequential damages.
205. I.e., CHIPS.
206. See CHARLES GooDHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS, 6-7, 86-102 (1988).
207. See generally Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753
0
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itself states, Federal Reserve regulations and Reserve Bank operating
circulars supersede inconsistent provisions of Article 4A. 208 Although
the scope of Federal Reserve Regulation J is the same as that of a funds
transfer system rule, 209 the rules of Fedwire are federal regulations,
not a system's rules. In contrast, the CHIPS Rules lack such legal
authority. CHIPS Rules are subordinate to Article 4A unless the
adopting statute states that Article 4A may be varied by a funds transfer
system rule. 210

VI. CONCLUSION
Funds transfer law should not be critically evaluated from a transaction-neutral perspective, but rather judged in the context of the
international financial market interest groups it principally affects. The
markets for foreign exchange, short-term money instruments, corporate
securities, derivative products and interbank funds generate the bulk of
wire transfer activity. Because the catalysts for large-value funds
transfers are financial market deals, the nature of the interest groups in
the financial markets and their relative positions must be understood
before the macroeconomic success of funds transfer law can be gauged.
Funds transfer law must be held to the test of meeting the interests of
the groups it most prominently affects: financial institutions transacting
in foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, corporate
securities, derivative products and interbank lending.
This Article has argued that microeconomic and banking concepts
provide the critical tools to gauge whether the law supports trading
activities, clearing and settlement procedures, and funds transfer
systems. The essence of the test must be to employ fundamental
microeconomic and banking concepts to measure the extent to which
U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law satisfy the interests of
traders, settlements departments and funds transfer systems.
The same-day execution rules contained in U.C.C. Article 4A are
problematic because of the potential for delays inherent in a beneficiary
bank's acceptance of a payment order for the beneficiary. The U.N.
Model Law rule is unsatisfactory because of the potential for cumulative
delays in paying the beneficiary and administrative difficulties in
passing value as of a certain date. Both rules could be improved by
tightening the time deadlines for action by receiving banks, thereby

(1981) (arguing that contradiction and discontinuity vitiate the principle of freedom of contract).
208. U.C.C. § 4A-107.
209. 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(b)(2)(v) (1993).
210. See U.C.C. § 4A-501 cmt. I.
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meeting the traders' interest in high-speed funds transfers. The open
invitation in the U.N. Model Law for draconian remedies in the cases
of failure to execute a payment order and improper ·execution of a
payment order is troubling because of the increase in transaction costs
it is likely to provoke. Correcting this defect will serve the traders'
interests in minimizing costs.
The U.N. Model Law affords little certainty to settlements departments because of the lack of a receiver finality rule and the questionable status of the discharge rule. The failure of the U.N. Model Law
to clarify certain payment order processing matters heightens the uncertainty. Both the U.N. Model Law and U.C.C. Article 4A appear to
meet the interest of settlements departments in efficiently allocating the
risk of interloper fraud.
Systemic risk reduction efforts of funds transfer systems are generally
neglected in the U.N. Model Law; these systems are ignored and the
status of their rules is unclear. This contrasts with the treatment
afforded by U.C.C. Article 4A. Article 4A, however, still needs
improvement to adequately tailor the law to the needs of the relevant
·
interest group.
This Article represents only the beginning of the scholarly research
agenda on funds transfers. Because these statutes were so recently
enacted there is little case law interpretation available. The common
law, surely, will interpret and shape the statute. 211 Whether it does so
with an understanding of the dynamic money movers and the non-stop
global financial markets remains to be seen.

211.

See id. § 4A-102 cmt.

